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Endogenous Timing of Actions under Conßict between Two
Types of Second Mover Advantage
Young-Ro Yoon1
Abstract
In a model, two players, heterogeneous in their information quality, compete with each other
with perfect information about the other players information quality. If they can decide their
timings of actions endogenously, the less-informed player has an incentive to delay her action for
learning. On the other hand, the more-informed player wants to delay her action to prevent her
information from being revealed, not to enable her to learn. The conßict of these two types of
second mover advantages yields a war of attrition. Although both players can beneÞt from acting
as the follower, the gain from a delay for learning is greater than that for preventing the others
learning. Therefore, a cost for the delay in action plays an important role in characterizing the
equilibrium. In contrast to the literature, in which only informational externalities are considered,
this article shows that the introduction of payoﬀ externalities contributes to diﬀerent procedures
and reasoning processes through which the heterogeneous players timings of actions are decided
endogenously.
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1 INTRODUCTION
When actions are taken sequentially, the order of the actions is important for the possibility of
learning. When someone takes an action, her action reßects the information on which it is based.
Others who observe her action can then infer her information, which may in turn aﬀect their
own decisions and actions. This phenomenon deÞned what are called informational externalities,
which gives agents an incentive to delay their actions for learning if the waiting option is available.
Regarding this, much of the literature has focused on the topic of delay in an endogenous timing
model in which informational externalities are present. However, in the real world, there exist many
economic settings in which the payoﬀ externalities, along with the informational externalities, play
an important role in agents decision on the timing of the action.
Take for example the R&D race between Þrms of heterogeneous quality. Suppose that other Þrms
can imitate the leading Þrms innovations as a result of the insuﬃcient enforcement of the patent
law. Then, the leading Þrms payoﬀs associated with R&D success can be reduced. Alternatively,
other Þrms can have an advantage by acting as the followers and incurring a smaller R&D cost
as a result of learning from the leading Þrms technology. Moreover, the following Þrms can make
improvements by both enhancing existing features and adding new features as a result of the
observing prevailing technology.2 In both cases, the leading Þrms incentive for innovation may
decrease due to the possibility of technology spillover, and the development of new technology
might be suppressed or delayed.
Another example involves the uncertainty in return rates for asset investment.3 It is common
for investors with insuﬃcient information to mimic the choice of a reputable agent. Thus, when
a reputable agent makes an investment in a speciÞc asset, other investors may likely follow that
choice. This imitating behavior may result in a decrease in the dividend received by the reputable
agent, therefore she might have an incentive to delay her investment, and thereby prevent others
from imitating her behavior.
The above examples involve the learning aspect of the second mover advantage. When there
is an uncertainty, the follower can take advantage of the leaders knowledge, experience or action.
With regard to this, a growing body of evidence suggests the learning aspect of the second mover
advantage. For example, according to Golder and Tellis (1996), the failure rate of pioneers in a new
market was very high and the Þrms that dominated the market were the second entrants into the
market. It can be conjectured that this second mover advantage might have its source in learning
made possible by observing the leaders experience.4
2The case of Web browsers, Internet Explorer vs. Netscape, mentioned in Zhang and Markman (1998), is a good
example of this. Netscape was the pioneer in the Web browser market, while Internet Explorer was a late entrant.
When Internet Explorer was introduced, it had features that Netscape did not have, which was one reason for its
success. This was referred to by Bill Gates as the strategy of embrace and extend, i.e., embracing current Internet
standards and then extending them.
3 In this example, we have to assume that the action, which denotes the choice of asset, is irreversible and can
only be taken once. If not, the manipulation by the more-informed agent or reputable agent can be available, which
is not the main interest of this article.
4The Harvard Business School case about Wal-Mart also shows how the imitation of the second mover can be
successful. In this case, when Wal-Mart was in second place in the wholesale industry, one of its strategies was
precisely to imitate what the Þrms in Þrst place did. That approach was very successful, and in 1993, Wal-Mart had
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The above examples also implicitly imply another aspect of the second mover advantage. In
both the R&D race and the asset investment examples, the delays in actions of the leading Þrm and
the reputable agent are not motivated by the advantage of learning. Rather, their delays in action
are done in order to prevent the spillover of their superior information or technology, which can
then cause a decrease in their payoﬀs. That is, their second mover advantage comes from preventing
others free-riding behaviors by acting as the followers, not from what they can learn from others. Up
to now, this type of second mover advantage has not received much attention. To my knowledge,
there is no empirical literature which deals with this topic directly. However, some articles can
be mentioned as the ones which show the related results. Moser (2001) and Lerner (2002) Þnd
that the patent system stimulates R&D and innovation. Additionally, Lanjouw and Cockburn
(2002) and Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen (2001) show that the innovations are concentrated in the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries because the patents in these areas are relatively easy
to deÞne and imitation can be easily detected. The results of these studies conversely imply that
if achievement as a leader cannot be Þrmly protected, the incentive for innovation may decrease.
Extending this result further, it can be argued that whether a leaders gain can be protected or not
plays an important role in an agents decision on the timing of their actions.
In the real world, there are many cases in which the second movers can easily free-ride on
the leader because of the absence of any system that protects the leaders initiative. The cases
mentioned above can be the good examples. Also, generally in business, other Þrms are allowed to
follow or imitate a leading Þrms successful business strategy. In this way, if the follower can freely
turn the leaders experience or inferred information to her own advantage, and if the leader can be
damaged by it, then the agent who would otherwise act as a leader may have an incentive to delay
an action. Then, this may result in a conßict between two types of second mover advantage, the
one from learning and the other from preventing the others learning. In this kind of situation, if
the action timings are decided endogenously, which type of second mover advantage will succeed
in being taken up the follower?
The much of current literature that deals with the endogenous timing of actions does not provide
an answer to this question because the studies discussed focus only on the learning aspect of the
second mover advantage. Consequently, in this article, I introduce a model in which the payoﬀ
externalities, along with the informational externalities, are considered together in analyzing the
incentives of delay in actions and the endogenous timings of actions of the heterogeneous players.
The model that I consider in this paper is as follows. Two players, A and B, make a forecast
(action) about the true state of a forthcoming period when that state is as yet unknown.5 There are
two rounds during which each player can take an irreversible action only once. Each player observes
her own signal, which is correlated with the true state and private information. The players are
heterogeneous in that their observed signals diﬀer in precision, which is public information. For
the competitive environment of the common task, their reputations or monetary wages depend on
both players performances. Hence, with being successful in doing a task, the relative performance
succeeded in becoming the leader in the wholesale industry. There is general consensus that one of the main reasons
why Wal-Mart was able to succeed was its strategy of imitation.
5Throughout this paper, the act of forecasting is indicated by the phrase the action.
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compared to her rival is also essential. Therefore, the success or failure of each players performance
endogenously determines whether the other players identical action causes a positive or a negative
payoﬀ externality. Also, it is assumed that a follower can observe a leaders action if the actions
are taken sequentially. Thus, informational externalities are also embedded in the model. Under
this setup, each player should decide her own timing of action and whether to act according to her
information.
Throughout this paper, it is assumed that the precision of Bs signal is greater than that of
A. Thus, in the following discussion, A denotes the less-informed player and B denotes the more-
informed player. The main results can be summarized as follows.
Compared to the literature in which only the informational externalities are considered, the
learning incentive is not the unique reason for a delay in action. In the case of A who knows that
she is the less-informed player, she has an incentive to delay her action in order to infer the more
precise information by observing Bs action. The more-informed player B also has an incentive to
delay her action, but her delay is not for the sake of learning. B knows that when she acts as a
leader, her true signal will be inferred perfectly by A, which will induce As same action always.
As B knows that she is the more-informed player, she regards As identical action as a strategic
substitute. Hence, she wants to prevent her information from being revealed to A and this is why
she intends to delay her action. In this way, the presence of payoﬀ externalities yield the conßict
between two types of second mover advantage, the one from learning and the other from preventing
others learning.
The key result of this article is that, even though each players can earn gain from a delay in
action, As gain from a delay in action is greater than that of B. In other words, the gain from
a delay for learning is greater than that for preventing the others learning. Hence, when cost is
imposed for a delay of action, as it increases, the Þrst one who is driven out of the delay race is B.
Therefore, if sequential actions are derived in a pure strategy equilibrium, the leader is always the
more-informed player. If a delay cost allows both players to have positive net gains from a delay,
there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium. Regarding this equilibrium, the comparative statics yield
the possibility that the more-informed player B can act voluntarily without using a waiting option,
although it is available, in order to minimize a risk of being penalized by inducing the less-informed
players identical action. Regarding the derived equilibrium, the further analysis about the eﬀects
of a waiting option on each players welfare and the eﬀects of a delay cost on the eﬃcient ordering
of action are also provided.
In brief, the analysis of this article shows that the introduction of payoﬀ externalities provides
a diﬀerent rationale for the heterogeneous players endogenous timing of actions than the model
in which only the informational externalities are considered. If only the informational externalities
are considered, the delay in action is initiated from an incentive of learning and the more-informed
player acts as the leader because she has less to gain in learning than the other player. On the other
hand, in this model, the consideration of payoﬀ externalities yields the conßict between two types
of second mover advantage because the more-informed player intends to prevent the less-informed
players learning. However, the more-informed player acts as the leader because she is less-patient
to the payoﬀ discount for a delay in action. Moreover, in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the
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more-informed player can act as the leader voluntarily in order to induce the less-informed players
imitation. These kinds of incentives for the more-informed player, one which prevents the others
learning and one which induces the others learning, are the results which can be derived from
considering payoﬀ externalities along with informational externalities. In this way, this study
enriches the analysis of the heterogeneous players endogenous ordering of actions when payoﬀ
externalities and informational externalities both matter.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the related literature. In
Section 3, I introduce the model. In Section 4, I derive each players best response according to
the timing of action. In Section 5, as the benchmark case, I characterize the equilibrium of action
timing when only the informational externalities matter. In Section 6, I characterize the equilibrium
of action timing when payoﬀ externalities matter along with informational externalities. Finally,
Section 7 is a concluding remark.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
The following articles can be introduced as the ones which deal with the topic of endogenous
timing of actions in various environments. Chamley and Gale (1994) and Zhang (1997) discuss
the strategic delay and the endogenous timing of action when only the informational externalities
are present. In Chamley and Gale (1994), a player has an incentive to delay her action in order
to observe other players decisions for information updating. Zhang (1997) links this result to the
informational cascade topic. He asserts that, if players are heterogeneous, the most-informed player
has the least patience in regards to the cost of delay because she has the least to learn than other
players. Thus, she acts as the leader and other players mimic her action immediately. In these
models, although the action timing is decided endogenously, no payoﬀ externalities are considered.
Thus, each players main concern in deciding the delay in action is whether to infer other players
information for learning.
Damme and Hurkens (1998), (2004) consider a linear quantity setting and price setting duopoly
game with diﬀerentiated products when the timing of commitment is decided endogenously. They
show that in a risk-dominant equilibrium, the high cost Þrm will choose to wait and the low cost
Þrm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader and price leader. Although the timing of
action is decided endogenously, in both models, the informational externalities do not play a role
in characterizing the equilibrium.
The most relevant paper on this topic with this article is Frisell (2003) which deals with a
case in which two Þrms decide a product design and when to enter the market when the true
value of product design is not known. The signal and action space are continuous and it assumes
imperfect information about the other Þrms information quality. By allowing the learning and
direct payoﬀ externalities of each Þrms decision, it analyzes the eﬀects of both informational and
payoﬀ externalities on the endogenous timing of actions as this article does. According to the
result, if the payoﬀ externalities are positive or relatively weakly negative, the more-informed Þrm
acts as the leader because she has the less to learn. On the other hand, if the externalities are
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strongly negative, the more-informed Þrm acts as the follower because it has the more to gain from
outwaiting the other Þrm.
This model is distinct from Frisell (2003) in following points. In Frisell (2003), whether both
players similar actions cause the positive or the negative payoﬀ externalities is assumed exoge-
nously and, moreover, it is common to both players.6 On the other hand, in my model, what is
given exogenously is each players information quality and the competition environment endoge-
nously results in whether the other players same action cause the positive or the negative payoﬀ
externalities. Furthermore two players evaluates the other players same action diﬀerently. Hence,
compared to Frisell (2003), this model speciÞes when the other players same action is evaluated
as the strategic substitute and complement and why it is. Also, the endogenously derived direct
conßict of two types of the second mover advantage, which is not captured in Frisell (2003), yields
the main result that the gain from delay for learning is greater than that for preventing others
learning. Although this model assumes that each agents information quality is public information,
the suﬃcient information for this type of conßict is who the more- and the less-informed player is.
Thus, the analysis of this model can also be extended into the case in which only the comparative
degree of being informed is known, which is more applicable to the real world. By providing the
complementary results to Frisell (2003), the model in this study enriches the analysis of the hetero-
geneous players endogenous timing game when payoﬀ externalities and informational externalities
both matter.
3 MODEL
Suppose there are two players, A and B, i ∈ {A,B} whose job is to provide a forecast about the
true state of forthcoming period. The true state is w ∈ {H,L} and those are mutually exclusive. To
both players, it is known that the prior probability of each state is Pr(w = H) = Pr(w = L) = 12 .
Before making a forecast, each player observes her own signal θi ∈ {h, l} which is correlated with
the true state. The draws of their signals are conditionally independent given the true state. Each
players signal θi ∈ {h, l} is private information, so that each player does not know which signal is
observed by the other player. The signal θi partially reveals the information about the true state
in following way
Pr(θi = h|w = H) = Pr(θi = l|w = L) = pi
Pr(θi = h|w = L) = Pr(θi = l|w = H) = 1− pi
where pi ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. Here, pi measures the precision of player is signal θi, so that it can also be
interpreted as information quality. As pi approaches 12 , it means her signal becomes less informative.
As pi approaches 1, it means her signal becomes more informative about the true state. I assume
6In Frisell (2003), each agents payoﬀ function is given as πi = −(θi − ρ)2 −α(θi − θj)2 − δti, i 6= j where ρ is the
unknown true state, θi and θj are each players selection of action, δ is payoﬀ discount for delay and ti is is timing of
action. Here, α measures the degree of payoﬀ externalities. If α > (<)0, both players same actions cause the positive
(negative) externalities. It is assumed that α is given exogenously and, for both players i and j, α is common.
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that the players are heterogeneous in information quality. Without loss of generality, it is assumed
that A is the less-informed player and B is the more-informed player.
Assumption 1 pA < pB
Player i0s action set is denoted by A = {ai, ti}. Here, ai ∈ {h, l} denotes player is action in
regards to forecasting the true state. If ai = h (ai = l), it denotes that player i0s forecast is w = H
(w = L). Also, ti ∈ {t1, t2} denotes player is timing of action. Each player has two rounds during
which she can take one irreversible action. If player i acts in round 1 (round 2), then it is denoted
by ti = t1 (ti = t2). If ti = t1 and t−i = t2, then it means that i is a leader and −i is a follower.
If the actions are taken sequentially, the follower can observe the leaders action before taking her
own action. However, if ti = t−i, that is if both players act simultaneously, then each player has
no chance to observe the other players action.
Each players net payoﬀ is deÞned by
πi(ai, a−i, ti, t−i) = πi (·)− f (ti) where f (ti) =
(
0 if ti = t1
c if ti = t2
where πi (·) denotes the gross payoﬀ and πi (·) denotes the net payoﬀ after considering a penalty for
a delay in action. If she acts in round 2, she has to pay a cost c for a delay in action. We assume
that c is determined exogenously and can be interpreted as the discount in reputation for delaying
action. The gross payoﬀ πi is determined after the realization of the true state w conditional on
both players actions, ai and a−i, as follows where γ ≥ 1.
w aB = w aB 6= w
aA = w 1, 1 γ,−γ
aA 6= w −γ, γ −1,−1
This payoﬀ structure is designed in order to incorporate the competitive environment between
two players. Here, γ (−γ) is the payoﬀ earned when a player is the unique one who took a correct
(wrong) action. When both players act identically to reveal the true state correctly, both players
get +1, and if not, they earn −1. When her action reveals the true state correctly, if the other
player acts identically, then a negative payoﬀ externality results because the good reputation should
be shared. On the contrary, when her action fails in revealing the true state, if the other player
acted identically, then a positive payoﬀ externality results because the blame or the penalty can be
shared. In this way, the accuracy of a players action endogenously determines whether the other
players identical action is a strategic substitute or a strategic complement. However, as the true
state w is not revealed until both players act, each player does not know certainly whether the
other players same action is aﬃrmative or not.
In addition, the value of γ, whether it is γ > 1 or γ = 1, plays an important role. If γ = 1,
then as each players gross payoﬀ depends only on the correctness of her own action, it corresponds
to the case in which no payoﬀ externalities are present. However, if γ > 1, then her gross payoﬀ
depends on the correctness of both her and the rivals actions. Thus, it corresponds to the case in
which the payoﬀ externalities are present.
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Under this setup, player i should decide her timing of action ti and the truthfulness of her
action. Especially, the latter decision depends on the timings of actions of both her and the other
player. Finally, below are the deÞnitions which will be used throughout this paper.
DeÞnition 1 Truthful action: If ai = θi, then we say that player i0s action is truthful.
DeÞnition 2 Herding: When θi 6= a−i, if ai = a−i 6= θi, then we say that player i exhibits
herding.
4 DERIVING THE BEST RESPONSE
In this section, we derive each players best response according to her timing of action. Below, it
is shown that the derived results are quite intuitive. The detailed procedure of deriving the best
responses is summarized in the Appendix. Instead, we provide a brief sketch of the procedure and
focus on the intuition of the derived results.
First, assume that i acts as the follower, i.e., ti = t2 and t−i = t1 where i ∈ {A,B}. As i has her
own information θi and can observe a−i, her posterior belief is Pr(w| θi, θ−i). However, i does not
know whether -is action is truthful or not because she has no chance to observe θ−i. Hence, θ−i
should be inferred according to her belief about the truthfulness of a−i. Then, her best response is
derived from X
w
Pr(w| θi, θ−i)π (θi = ai, a−i) ≷
X
w
Pr(w| θi, θ−i)π (θi 6= ai, a−i) (1)
where LHS denotes the expected payoﬀ when i reveals her signal θi truthfully and Eπi(ai 6= θi)
denotes the one when she deviates from her signal θi.
Second, assume that i acts as the leader, i.e., ti = t1 and t−i = t2 where i ∈ {A,B}. As i acts as
the leader, she cannot observe -i s action before taking her own action, which means that i has no
chance to infer θ−i. Thus, i s posterior beliefs should be about the true state and -i s true signal,
i.e., Pr(w, θ−i| θi). From the best response of -i derived from (1), i can expect a−i conditional on
the conjectured θ−i. Then, her best response is derived fromX
w
X
θ−i
Pr(w, θ−i| θi)π (θi = ai, a−i) ≷
X
w
X
θ−i
Pr(w, θ−i| θi)π (θi 6= ai, a−i) (2)
where LHS denotes the expected payoﬀ when player i reveals her signal θi truthfully and Eπi(ai 6=
θi) denotes the one when she deviates from her signal θi.
Finally, assume that both players act simultaneously, i.e., ti = t−i. By assumption, as i has
no chance to infer θ−i, i s posterior beliefs should be Pr(w, θ−i| θi). However, unlike the case in
which she acts as the leader, -i s best response is not known. Therefore, a−i should be expected
according to her belief about the truthfulness of a−i conditional on the conjectured θ−i. Then, her
best response is derived from (2).
The above analysis yields that each players best response, according to both players timings
of action, can be summarized as follows.
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Proposition 1
1) Player A:
1-1) Suppose that she acts as the leader or both players act simultaneously. Then, she reveals
her signal truthfully.
1-2) Suppose that she acts as the follower. If θA = aB(= θB), she reveals her signal truthfully
and if θA 6= aB(= θB), she exhibits herding.
2) Player B:
She always reveals her signal truthfully.
Proof
In the Appendix.
Suppose that each player acts as the follower. Then, in the case of B, she reports her signal
truthfully always. Intuitively, from assumption pB > pA, B gives more credit to the correctness
of her information. Thus, although θB 6= θA, she ignores θA and sticks to θB. In the case of A,
she knows that B is the more-informed player. Hence, when θA 6= θB, she gives more weight to
the possibility that Bs signal is correct. Thus, she imitates Bs action while ignoring her own
signal.7 If each player acts as the leader or actions are taken simultaneously, it is intuitive that
a player reveals her signal truthfully as the only available information is her own signal. As the
follower knows that leaders true signal is revealed truthfully, she assigns the zero probability to
the possibility that the leader deviates from her signal. Therefore, the action of the leader reveals
the leaders true signal and the follower can infer it perfectly through observing the leaders action.
In following, πLi denotes player is expected gross payoﬀ when she acts as the leader, π
F
i denotes
the one when she acts as the follower, and πSi denotes the one when both players act simultaneously.
Note that the timing of action is decided endogenously and each player should decide her timing of
action in advance. As the available information to player i is only her own signal θi, the posterior
belief should be about the true state and the other players true signal Pr(w, θ−i| θi). How a−i will
actually be realized depends on -i s best responses which are demonstrated in Proposition 1. Then,
each players expected gross payoﬀs are calculated as follows,
πLA = π
S
A = − (γpB − pB − γpA − pA + 1) , πFA = (2pB − 1) (3)
πLB = (2pB − 1) , πFB = πSB = (pA + pB − γpA + γpB − 1)
from
P
w
P
θ−i Pr(w, θ−i| θi)π (ai, a−i).
5 WHEN NO PAYOFF EXTERNALITIES ARE PRESENT
As a bench mark case, we assume the case in which no payoﬀ externalities are present. This case
corresponds to the one in which γ = 1 because her gross payoﬀ depends only on the correctness
7 In this case, herding is eﬃcient because B has the more precise information than A does. Also, as B does not
ignore her information, in this model, the ineﬃcient herding does not happen.
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of her own action. As the Þrst step, suppose c = 0.8 Then, from (3), each players expected gross
payoﬀs γ = 1 are
πLA = π
S
A = (2pA − 1) , πFA = (2pB − 1) (4)
πLB = π
F
B = π
S
B = (2pB − 1)
The comparison of (4) yields that
πLA = π
S
A < π
F
A and π
L
B = π
F
B = π
S
B
In the case of A, the best case is when she acts as a follower because As perfect inference of
θB is possible. When θB = aB 6= θA, as A ignores her true signal and imitate Bs action, she can
prevent the case in which aB 6= aA by acting as the follower. That is, A wants to delay her action
for learning. On the other hand, whether she acts as a leader or both players actions are taken
simultaneously, it is same that A has no chance to infer Bs signal before taking her own action.
Therefore, πLA = π
S
A is derived. On the other hand, in the case of B, π
L
B = π
F
B = π
S
B is derived
because her best response is always to reveal her signal truthfully and As action does not aﬀect
her payoﬀ.
Suppose that c > 0. Then, the equilibrium for the timing of action when γ = 1 can be charac-
terized as follows.
Proposition 2
Suppose that no payoﬀ externalities are present, i.e., γ = 1.
1) Suppose c > 2 (pB − pA). Then, (tA, tB) = (t1, t1).
2) Suppose c < 2 (pB − pA). Then, (tA, tB) = (t2, t1).
We denote V di (γ = 1) as player is gain from a delay in action when γ = 1. Then,
V dA (γ = 1) = 2 (pB − pA) and V dB (γ = 1) = 0
As B has no reason to delay her action with paying a cost when she earns no gain from a delay,
always tB = t1, i.e., V dB (γ = 1) = 0 < c. On the contrary, A wants to delay her action for learning
and whether she actually can delay her action or not depends on the value of c. If the expected
gain from a delay in action is greater than the cost of delay, i.e., c < 2 (pB − pA) = V dA , then she
delays her action and acts at t = t2. If not, i.e., c > 2 (pB − pA) = V dA, then A should give up
delaying her action and act at t = t1. Thus, if the sequential actions are derived endogenously, the
leader is always the more-informed player. Also, from ∂V
d
A(γ=1)
∂pB
> 0 and ∂V
d
A(γ=1)
∂pA
< 0, the following
result is derived.
8The analysis under the assumption c = 0 clariÞes whether the agents incentive to delay her action is caused by
the cost of delay. For example, suppose that πFi > π
L
i when c = 0. When c > 0, if she acts at round 1, it means that
she should act without delay although she wants to use a waiting option. On the other hand, suppose that when
c = 0, πLi > π
F
i . Then, although c > 0, she will act in round 1 because she wants to act in round 1 voluntarily. It
can be checked that her action as the leader is not caused by the cost of a delay in action.
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Corollary 1
Suppose that γ = 1. Then, as pB increases or pA decreases, the probability that the sequential
actions are derived endogenously increases.
6 WHEN PAYOFF EXTERNALITIES ARE PRESENT
6.1 EQUILIBRIUM
Now, assume that γ > 1. Then, as player is gross payoﬀ depends on the correctness of both
players actions ai and a−i, the payoﬀ externalities are present. If we assume that c = 0, then the
comparison of the gross expected payoﬀs yields
πLA = π
S
A < π
F
A
πLB < π
F
B = π
S
B
In the case of A, although payoﬀ externalities matter, there should be no change in that the
best case to her is when she acts as the follower for the possibility of learning. Meanwhile, in the
case of B, unlike the case in which no payoﬀ externalities are present (πLB = π
F
B = π
S
B), the worst
case is when she acts as the leader. This result can be explained from the following reasoning.
From Bs viewpoint, if she acts as the leader, her true signal is revealed to A perfectly and it induce
As identical action. Assume that θB reveals the true state correctly. In this case, if B is the
unique player who took the correct action, Bs payoﬀ is πB = γ. However, if A imitates her action,
Bs payoﬀ is πB = 1 < γ. Of course, if it turns out that θB 6= w, As imitation can work in Bs
favor because she earns −1 > −γ. However, from the assumption pA < pB, B gives more weight
to the possibility that her signal is correct. Thus, she gives more weight to the possibility that As
imitation causes the negative payoﬀ externalities. In other words, B regards As same action as a
strategic substitute. Therefore, it can be checked that B intends to delay her action not for the sake
of learning, but for the sake of preventing her information from being revealed to A. Whether she
acts as a follower or both players act simultaneously, for either case, Bs true signal is not revealed
to A. Thus, πFB = π
S
B is derived.
Remark 2
Suppose that the payoﬀ externalities are present, i.e., γ > 1. Then,
1) The less-informed player wants to delay her action for learning.
2) The more-informed player wants to delay her action in order to prevent her information from
being revealed. In other words, she wants to delay her action in order to prevent the less-informed
players learning.
As Remark 2 shows, the competitive environment between players results in a conßict between
two types of second mover advantages. Hence, if the timing of actions is decided endogenously, then
our game turns out to be the war of attrition and the cost for a delay in action plays an important
role in characterizing the equilibrium.
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Under the payoﬀ discount c > 0, the payoﬀ matrix which describes our game is as follows
tB = t1 tB = t2
tA = t1 π
S1
A , π
S1
B π
L
A, π
F
B
tA = t2 π
F
A, π
L
B π
S2
A , π
S2
B
where πS1i = π
S
i , π
L
i = π
L
i , π
F
i = π
F
i − c and πS2i = πSi − c for i ∈ {A,B}.
If we recall (3), each players gain from a delay in action is
V dA (γ > 1) = (pB − pA) (γ + 1) and V dB (γ > 1) = (pB − pA) (γ − 1) (5)
where V di (γ > 1) denotes is value from a delay in action when γ > 1. Especially, V
d
A (γ > 1) is As
expected gain attained from learning through observing Bs action. Also, V dB (γ > 1) is Bs expected
gain attained through preventing As learning. Then, from (5), following can be proposed.
Proposition 3
The gain of delay for learning is greater than that for preventing the others learning, i.e.,
V dB (γ > 1) < V
d
A (γ > 1)
That is, although both players receive gains from a delay in action, the gain of the less-informed
player is greater than that of the more-informed player. Then, for given c > 0, the equilibrium of
the action timing can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 4
Suppose that the payoﬀ externalities are present, i.e., γ > 1. Then, the equilibrium of the timing
of action can be characterized as follows.
1) Suppose 0 < c < V dB (γ > 1) . Then, (z, q) =
³
(pB−pA)(γ−1)−c
(γ−1)(pB−pA) ,
c
(γ+1)(pB−pA)
´
where z =
Pr(tA = t1) and q = Pr(tB = t1).
2) Suppose V dB (γ > 1) < c < V
d
A (γ > 1) . Then, (tA, tB) = (t2, t1).
3) Suppose c > V dA (γ > 1) . Then, (tA, tB) = (t1, t1).
Proof
The straightforward computation yields the equilibrium for following two cases, c2 < c < c1
and c > c1. Below, we focus on the mixed strategy equilibrium for 0 < c < c2. In the following, we
denote z = Pr(tA = t1) and q = Pr(tB = 1). Then, for player A, VA(tA = t1) = qπS1A + (1 − q)πLA
and VA(tA = t2) = qπFA+(1− q)πS2A where VA(tA = tn) is the value of taking action at tn, n = 1, 2.
Then, from VA(tA = t1) = VA(tA = t2),
q =
πS2A − πLA
πS1A − πLA − πFA + πS2A
=
c
(γ + 1) (pB − pA)
In case of B, VB(tB = t1) = zπS1B + (1 − z)πLB and VB(tB = t2) = zπFB + (1 − z)πS2B . Then from
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VB(tB = t1) = VB(tB = t2),
z =
πS2B − πLB
πS1B − πLB − πFB + πS2B
=
(pB − pA) (γ − 1)− c
(γ − 1) (pB − pA)
Finally, if 0 < c < c2, (z, q) =
³
(pB−pA)(γ−1)−c
(γ−1)(pB−pA) ,
c
(γ+1)(pB−pA)
´
where z = Pr(tA = t1), q = Pr(tB =
1).
First, if c > V dA (γ > 1) , both players act simultaneously at t = t1 because both players gains
from a delay in action are dominated by the suﬃciently high cost for a delay in action. Second, if
V dB (γ > 1) < c < V
d
A (γ > 1) , then A acts as the follower and B acts as the leader. This explains
the situation in which, as the cost for a delay in action increases, the Þrst player driven out of the
delay race is B because her gain is less than that of A.
Finally, if 0 < c < V dB (γ > 1) , both players can delay their actions because a cost of delay in
action is even less than the more-informed players gain of delay. In this case, there exists no pure
strategy Nash equilibrium from following reasoning. Suppose that tB = t2. Then As best response
is tA = t1 because there is no need for her to delay her action with paying cost when she cannot
observe aB. Then, for tA = t1, Bs best response is tB = t1 because if tA = t1, her information is
not revealed to A whether tB = t1 or tB = t2. Then, for tB = t1, As best response is again tA = t2
because she can observe aB by delaying her action. Then, again, Bs best response is tB = t2 to
prevent her information from being revealed to A. In this way, each player wants to outguess the
other player, which yields no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Regarding the mixed strategy equilibrium, the comparative statics yield the following result.
Corollary 2
Consider the mixed strategy equilibrium derived when γ > 1 and 0 < c < (pB − pA) (γ − 1).
1) As γ increases, there is more possibility that (tA, tB) = (t1, t2).
2) As c Increases, there is more possibility that (tA, tB) = (t2, t1).
3) As pA increases, there is more possibility that (tA, tB) = (t2, t1).
4) As pB increases, there is more possibility that (tA, tB) = (t1, t2).
Proof
Note that (z, q) =
³
(pB−pA)(γ−1)−c
(γ−1)(pB−pA) ,
c
(γ+1)(pB−pA)
´
where z = Pr(tA = t1) and q = Pr(tB = t1).
Then, ∂q∂γ < 0,
∂z
∂c < 0,
∂q
∂c > 0,
∂q
∂pA
> 0 and ∂q∂pB < 0 are obvious from given z and q. Also,
∂z
∂γ =
c
(pB−pA)(γ−1)2 > 0,
∂z
∂pA
= − c
(γ−1)(pB−pA)2 < 0, and
∂z
∂pB
= c
(γ−1)(pB−pA)2 > 0.
First, if γ increases, there is more of a possibility that (tA, tB) = (t1, t2). Here, γ denotes the
degree of the payoﬀ externalities. Thus, as γ increases, Bs payoﬀ loss caused from As imitation
increases if her signal reveals the true state correctly. Therefore, Bs desire to prevent her informa-
tion from being revealed will increases. Player A will also have a greater incentive to imitate Bs
action because, as γ increases, the penalty which she earns when her action turns out to be wrong
increases. The result expects that, as the degree of the payoﬀ externalities increases, the desire for
preventing the others learning is greater than that of learning.
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Second, as c increases, there is more possibility that (tA, tB) = (t2, t1). Compared to A who
intends to delay for learning, the opportunity cost of Bs delay will be greater because her delay is
only for preventing her information from being revealed without any learning. Thus, as c increases,
there will be more of a possibility that B becomes less patient to the penalty for a delay in action.
Third, as As information quality increases, there is more of a possibility that (tA, tB) = (t2, t1).
Here, the high value of pA implies a greater possibility that θA = w. From Bs viewpoint, as pA
increases, she should also consider the case in which θA = w 6= θB. When it actually is, if A acts
as the leader and B acts as the follower, then πA = γ and πB = −γ, which is the worst case to B.
However, if B acts as the leader and A does as the follower, always aA = aB is derived because of
As imitation. Then, although it turns out that aA = aB 6= w, Bs payoﬀ is πB = −1 > −γ. In
this way, by acting as the leader, B can prevent the lowest payoﬀ by inducing As imitation. This
is why B can act as the leader voluntarily without using a waiting option, although it is available.
Of course, the high value of pA implies the high value of pB from our assumption pA < pB. Thus, B
may also have the greater incentive to act as the follower not to reveal her information. Regarding
these two conßicts, the result predicts that the former dominates the latter. In the case of A, the
high value of pA means a high possibility of θA = w. Then, this gives her less incentive to delay
her action because her learning incentive decreases. However, the high value of pA also means a
high possibility of θB = w from our assumption pA < pB. Thus, acting as the follower can still be
attractive to her. For these two conßicts, the result predicts that the latter dominate the former,
which makes A more likely to delay her action.
Finally, as Bs information quality decreases, there is more of a possibility that the equilibrium
is (tA, tB) = (t2, t1). The low pB implies a greater possibility of θB 6= w. Then, from the same
reasoning as found in the previous case, it can be better for B to act as the leader to induce As
imitation. From As viewpoint, the low pB also implies a low pA from our assumption pA < pB.
Thus, she can be more likely to delay her action.
Corollary 3
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, where γ > 1 and 0 < c < (pB − pA) (γ − 1), if the diﬀerence
between two informed players information quality is relatively small, B regards As identical action
as a strategic complement. That is, B can act in round 1 voluntarily without using a waiting option,
although it is available, in order to minimize a risk of payoﬀ loss.
6.2 EFFICIENCY
For given c, the consideration of the pure strategy equilibrium yields that
X
i∈{A,B}
πi (t2, t2) <
X
i∈{A,B}
πi (t1, t2) =
(
<
P
i∈{A,B} πi (t1, t1)
<
P
i∈{A,B} πi (t2, t1)
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where πi (tA, tB) denotes the expected payoﬀ of i ∈ {A,B} when tA, tB ∈ {t1, t2}. Also it can be
checked that
X
i∈{A,B}
πi (tA, tB) = (2pA − c+ 2pB − 2) =
(
<
P
i∈{A,B} πi (t1, t1)
<
P
i∈{A,B} πi (t2, t1)
where LHS is the sum of both players expected payoﬀs in a mixed strategy equilibrium. Hence, the
eﬃcient ordering of action depends on the comparison of
P
i∈{A,B} πi (t1, t1) and
P
i∈{A,B} πi (t2, t1)
where
P
i∈{A,B} πi (t1, t1) = 2 (pA + pB − 1) and
P
i∈{A,B} πi (t2, t1) = 2 (2pB − 1) − c. Then, it
can be shown that if c > 2 (pB − pA), (tA, tB) = (t1, t1) is eﬃcient and if 0 < c < 2 (pB − pA),
(tA, tB) = (t2, t1) is eﬃcient.
Alternatively, we can also consider the role of a cost for a delay in action on the eﬃcient ordering
of action when it is measured taking into consideration the gross expected payoﬀs, the one before
considering a payoﬀ discount for delay. Then, the eﬃciency is obtained when A acts as the follower
and B acts as the leader, i.e., (tA, tB) = (t2, t1) because A can imitate Bs action which is based on
the more precise information. Recall Proposition 3 and interpret c as a control variable. Then, if
0 < c < c2, in a mixed strategy equilibrium, (tA, tB) = (t2, t1) is derived with probability w(1−q). If
c2 < c < c1, the unique pure strategy equilibrium is (tA, tB) = (t2, t1). Hence, the eﬃcient ordering
of action is always derived endogenously. Finally, if c > c1, (tA, tB) = (t1, t1). Thus, the eﬃcient
ordering of action cannot be derived at all.
If we assume the case in which no cost is imposed for a delay of action, i.e., c = 0, B certainly
delays her action in order to prevent her information from being revealed to A. Then, in this case,
there exist the multiple equilibria (tA, tB) = (t1, t2) and (tA, tB) = (t2, t2). Although she delays her
action, as A has no chance to observe Bs true signal, she has the same expected payoﬀ regardless
of her timing of action. This shows that, if no cost is imposed for a delay in action, then the
eﬃcient ordering of action cannot be derived at all. Therefore, when the timing of action is decided
endogenously, a cost for a delay in action should be imposed in order to derive the eﬃcient ordering.
However, it should be noted that imposing a cost does not guarantee eﬃcient ordering. Therefore, in
order not to yield the suboptimal outcome, the knowledge about both players information quality
is essential.
6.3 EFFECT OF WAITING OPTION
In this section, we address the problem of whether the availability of a waiting option makes a
player ex-ante better oﬀ or worse oﬀ compared to the case in which both players are forced to take
actions simultaneously without using a waiting option. According to Proposition 2, if c > c1, then
a waiting option is not available to any player because c is greater than both players gains from
having a delay. Thus, we will focus on the following two cases, where c2 < c < c1 and 0 < c < c2
within which a waiting option is available to at least one of both players.
First, if c2 < c < c1, the equilibrium is (tA, tB) = (t2, t1) and the waiting option is available
only to A. Then, from πFA > π
L
A = π
S1
A > π
S2
A , it is easy to check that A becomes ex-ante better-
oﬀ from using a waiting option compared to the simultaneous actions at t = t1. Second, if 0 <
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c < c2, the waiting option is available to both players and the mixed strategy equilibrium (z, q) =³
(pB−pA)(γ−1)−c
(γ−1)(pB−pA) ,
c
(γ+1)(pB−pA)
´
exists. In the case of A, the value of taking action at t = t1 without
delay is given as VA(tA = t1, q) = qπS1A + (1 − q)πLA and the value of using waiting option is
given as VA(tA = t2, q) = qπFA + (1 − q)πS2A . Then, from the existence of 0 < q∗ < 1 such that
VA(tA = t1; q
∗) = VA(tA = t2; q∗), if we let
V (q∗) = VA(tA = t1; q∗) = VA(tA = t2; q∗)
where q∗ (γ, c, pA, pB) = c(γ+1)(pB−pA) , then
πS1A − V (q∗) = πS1A −
¡
q∗πS1A + (1− q∗)πLA
¢
=
¡
πS1A − πLA
¢
(1− q) = 0
which yields πS1A = V (q
∗) because πS1A = π
L
A. Therefore, the availability of a waiting option gives
no eﬀect on As welfare.
In the case of B, the value of taking action at t = t1 without delay is given by VB(tB = t1, w) =
zπS1B +(1−z)πLB and the value of using waiting option is given as VB(tB = t2, w) = zπFB+(1−z)πS2B .
Then, from the existence of 0 < z∗ < 1 such that VB(tB = t1, z∗) = VB(tB = t2; z∗), if we let
V (z∗) = VB(tB = t1, z∗) = VB(tB = t2; z∗)
where z∗ (γ, c, pA, pB) =
(pB−pA)(γ−1)−c
(γ−1)(pB−pA) , then
πS1B − V (z∗) = πS1B −
¡
zπS1B + (1− z)πLB
¢
=
¡
πS1B − πLB
¢
(1− z) > 0
which yields πS1B > V (z
∗) because πS1B > π
L
B. Thus, in the case of B, the availability of waiting
option makes her worse-oﬀ compared to the simultaneous action at t = t1.
Corollary 4
1) The availability of a waiting option makes the less-informed player weakly better-oﬀ compared
to the case in which the actions are taken simultaneously in round 1.
2) The availability of a waiting option makes the more-informed player worse-oﬀ compared to
the case in which the actions are taken simultaneously in round 1.
In other words, above results can be interpreted as follows. If a waiting option is used for
learning (preventing the others learning), it makes a player weakly better-oﬀ (strictly worse-oﬀ)
compared to the case in which both players should act simultaneously in round 1.
6.4 WHEN ONLY THE FOLLOWERS PAYOFF IS DISCOUNTED
At the above sections, it was assumed that a cost for a delay in action is imposed if a player acts in
round 2. In this section, we oﬀer a slight change to this assumption. Consider the case in which two
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agents are competing against each other in the same organization and a duty or a task is given to
them by the chief of the organization. Then, the assumption that a discount is imposed for a delay
in action is reasonable because the chief may know that the option of action timing is available to
both agents and a delay in action can be detected. However, the more common case is the one in
which the options for the timing of action are not likely to be known. For example, assume the
situation in which two competing Þrms are planning to launch new products or use a new marking
strategy. Then, what the consumers usually observe is who acts as the leader and who acts as
the follower and they will give a discount only to the follower. If we apply this consideration to
the model, then it corresponds to the case in which no penalty is imposed for either player, even
though both players act in round 2 if they act simultaneously.
Then, our game can be described by the following payoﬀ matrix,
tB = t1 tB = t2
tA = t1 π
S
A, π
S
B π
L
A, π
F
B
tA = t2 π
F
A, π
L
B π
S
A, π
S
B
where πLA = π
S
A = − (γpB − pB − γpA − pA + 1), πFA = (2pB − 1) − c, πLB = (2pB − 1), πSB =
(pA + pB − γpA + γpB − 1) and πFB = (pA + pB − γpA + γpB − 1)− c.
Proposition 5
Suppose that the penalty for a delay in action is imposed only if a player acts as the follower.
If c > (pB − pA) (γ + 1), (tA, tB) = (t1, t1), if c = (pB − pA) (γ + 1), (tA, tB) = (t1, t1) and (t2, t2)
and if c < (pB − pA) (γ + 1), (tA, tB) = (t2, t2).
Proof
Assume that z = Pr(tA = t1) and q = Pr(tB = t1). First, for A, VA(tA = t1) = qπSA+(1− q)πLA
and VA(tA = t2) = qπFA + (1− q)πSA where VA(tA = tn) is the value of taking action at tn, n = 1, 2.
Then,
VA(tA = t1)− VA(tA = t2) = −q (pB − pA − c− γpA + γpB)
So if c < (pB − pA) (γ + 1), from VA(tA = t1) < VA(tA = t2), the best response is q = 0 and if
c > (pB − pA) (γ + 1) , from VA(tA = t1) < VA(tA = t2), the best response is q = 1. Also, for B,
VB(tB = t1) = zπ
S
B + (1− z)πLB and VB(tB = t2) = zπFB + (1− z)πSB. Then,
VB(tA = t1)− VB(tA = t2)
= z (c+ pA − pB − γpA + γpB) + pB − pA + γpA − γpB
where c + pA − pB − γpA + γpB = (pB − pA) (γ − 1) + c > 0. So, if z > z∗, from VB(tA = t1) >
VB(tA = t2), q = 1, if z < z∗, from VB(tA = t1) < VB(tA = t2), q = 0 and if z = z∗, VB(tA = t1) =
VB(tA = t2) where z =
ππSB−πLB
πS1B −πLB−πFB+πS2B
= (γ−1)(pB−pA)c+(pB−pA)(γ−1) . From these, if c < (pB − pA) (γ + 1),
(q, z) = (0, 0), if c = (pB − pA) (γ + 1), (q, z) = (0, 0) and (1, 1) and if c > (pB − pA) (γ + 1),
(q, z) = (1, 1).
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Therefore, although c > 0 is imposed, if a payoﬀ is discounted only when a player acts as the
follower, always the simultaneous actions are derived endogenously. This also implies that, the
eﬃcient ordering of action, under which the less-informed player can imitate the more-informed
players action, cannot be derived endogenously.
7 CONCLUDING REMARK
In this paper, we analyze the eﬀects of both payoﬀ externalities and informational externalities
on the endogenous timing of actions. If each players information quality is public information,
so if it is known who the more- and the less-informed player, the less-informed (more-informed)
player regards the more-informed (less-informed) players same action as a strategic complement
(substitute). Hence, the less-informed player wants to delay her action in order to learn and the
more-informed player delays her action in order to prevent the less-informed players learning. This
conßict between two types of second mover advantage yields a delay race. However, the gain from
a delay for learning is greater than that for preventing others learning. Hence, when a penalty
is imposed for a delay in action, as it increases, the Þrst one driven out of the delay race is the
more-informed player. Therefore, in pure strategy equilibrium, if the sequential actions are derived,
the more-informed player acts as a leader. Moreover, if a cost for delay of action is suﬃciently low,
there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the more-informed player can act without using
a waiting option voluntarily in order to minimize a risk by inducing the less-informed players
same action. In this way, in contrast to the literature in which only informational externalities are
considered, this article shows that the introduction of payoﬀ externalities contributes to diﬀerent
procedures and reasoning processes through which the heterogeneous players timings of actions
are decided endogenously.
The available extensions of the current model are as follows. The analysis of above sections
was based on the assumption that each players information quality is public information, which
can be a too strong assumption to be applicable to the real world. Instead, the available common
case will be the one in which who the more- and the less-informed agent are is known to both
players although the exact value of each players information quality is still private information.
For example, when two agents are competing against each others for the common task, if one is the
reputable agent and the other one is not, then there can be a consensus in two players beliefs for
who the more- and the less-informed agents are. Regarding this situation, the analysis of this article
provides a clue to the analysis about that kind of situation. If we recall the procedure of deriving
each players equilibrium strategy and equilibrium of timing of action, the suﬃcient information
is not the exact values of those, but whose information is more precise, i.e., pA < pB. Therefore,
although the assumption that information quality is bot public information, if it is known who the
more- and the less-informed player are, the conßict between two types of second mover advantage
will be derived. However, the equilibrium will be characterized diﬀerently because the exact value
of information quality is missing. As the other available extension, the analysis about the case
in which each players information quality is private information will be worthwhile. In this case,
18
we can conjecture that each player can use the cut-oﬀ strategy which depends on her information
quality. If it is suﬃciently low, she can have an incentive to delay her action for learning. On the
other hand, if it is suﬃciently high, she can also have an incentive to delay her action in order to
prevent the others learning. Furthermore, there can also be the possibility that, if her information
quality is intermediate, she can act voluntarily without using a waiting option in order to minimize
her risk of payoﬀ loss by inducing the other agents identical action. These types of extensions will
enrich the analysis of the endogenous timing game of heterogeneous players and would be good
topics for the future research studies.
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8 APPENDIX
8.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
8.1.1 BEST RESPONSE AS THE FOLLOWER
PLAYER A Assume that A acts in round 2 when B already has acted in round 1. As A can
observe Bs action, she faces one of following two cases: θA = aB or θA 6= aB. However, in each
case, A does not know whether Bs action is truthful or not because she has no chance to observe
Bs true signal. Thus, As best response as a follower should be derived according to her belief for
the truthfulness of Bs action. Without a loss of generality, it is assumed that θA = h. In following,
A follows the decision rule (1).
Case 1) When A believes that Bs announcement is truthful.
Suppose that A believes that aB = θB. First, if As signal is same as Bs action, i.e., θA =
aB = h, her posterior beliefs are Pr(w = H|hA, hB) = pApBpApB+(1−pA)(1−pB) and Pr(w = L|hA, hB) =
(1−pA)(1−pB)
pApB+(1−pA)(1−pB) .Then, EπA(aA = θA) =
pA+pB−1
2pApB−pB−pA+1 > 0 andEπA(aA 6= θA) = −
(pA+pB−1)γ
(2pApB−pB−pA+1) <
0. Thus, if θA = aB, As best response is to reveal her signal truthfully. Second, suppose
that As signal is not same as Bs action, i.e., θA = h and aB = l. Then, As posterior beliefs
are Pr(w = H|hA, lB) = pA(1−pB)pA(1−pB)+(1−pA)pB and Pr(w = L|hA, lB) =
(1−pA)pB
pA(1−pB)+(1−pA)pB . Then,
EπA(aA = θA) =
(pB−pA)γ
2pApB−pB−pA < 0 and EπA(aA 6= θA) = −
(pB−pA)
(2pApB−pB−pA) > 0. Thus, if θA 6= aB,
As best response is to imitate Bs action ignoring her own signal.
Case 2) When A believes that Bs action is not truthful
Suppose that A believes that aB 6= θB. First, if As signal is same as Bs action, i.e., θA =
aB = h. Then, A believes that Bs true signal is θB = l. Thus, player As posterior beliefs
are Pr(w = H|hA, lB) = pA(1−pB)pA(1−pB)+(1−pA)pB and Pr(w = L|hA, lB) =
(1−pA)pB
(1−pA)pB+pA(1−pB) . Then,
EπA(aA = θA) =
pB−pA
2pApB−pB−pA < 0 and EπA(aA 6= θA) = −
(pB−pA)γ
2pApB−pB−pA > 0. Hence, As best
response is to deviate from her true signal. Second, suppose that As signal is not same as Bs
action, i.e., θA = h, aB = l. In this case, A believes that Bs true signal is θB = h. So, As posterior
beliefs are Pr(w = H|hA, hB) = pApBpApB+(1−pA)(1−pB) and Pr(w = L|hA, hB) =
(1−pA)(1−pB)
pApB+(1−pA)(1−pB) .
Then, EπA(aA = θA) =
(pA+pB−1)γ
2pApB−pB−pA+1 > 0 and EπA(aA 6= θA) = −
pA+pB−1
2pApB−pB−pA+1 < 0, which
yields that As best response is to reveal her signal truthfully.
Lemma A.1
Suppose that A acts in round 2 and B has already acted in round 1. Then As best response can
be described as follows.
1) Suppose that A believes that Bs action is truthful. Then if θA = aB, she reveals her signal
truthfully, but if θA 6= aB, she exhibits herding.
2) Suppose that A believes that Bs action is not truthful. Then if θA = aB, she exhibits herding,
but if θA 6= aB, she reveals her signal truthfully.
PLAYER B Assume that B acts in round 2 when A already acted in round 1. Again, B is lack
of the chance to observe As true signal. Thus, Bs best response should be derived according to
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her belief for the truthfulness of As action. Without a loss of generality, it is assumed that θB = h
and she follows the decision rule (1).
Case 1) When B believes that As truthful action
Suppose that B believes that aA = θA. First, if Bs signal is same as As action, i.e., aA =
θB = h, Bs posterior beliefs are Pr(w = H|hA, hB) = pApBpApB+(1−pA)(1−pB) and Pr(w = L|hA, hB) =
(1−pA)(1−pB)
pApB+(1−pA)(1−pB) .Then, EπB(aB = θB) =
pA+pB−1
2pApB−pB−pA+1 > 0 andEπB(aB 6= θB) = −
(pA+pB−1)γ
(2pApB−pB−pA+1) <
0. Thus, Bs best response as the follower is to reveal her signal truthfully. Second, suppose that Bs
signal is not same with As action, i.e., aA = l and θB = h. Then, Bs posterior beliefs for true state
are Pr(w = H| lA, hB) = (1−pA)pBpA(1−pB)+(1−pA)pB and Pr(w = L| lA, hB) =
pA(1−pB)
pA(1−pB)+(1−pA)pB . Then,
EπB(aB = θB) = − (pB−pA)γ2pApB−pB−pA > 0 and EπB(aB 6= θB) =
pB−pA
2pApB−pB−pA < 0, which yields that
Bs best response as the follower is to reveal her signal truthfully.
Case 2) When B believes that As action is not truthful.
Suppose that aA = θB = h. In this case, B believes that As true signal is θA = l. Thus, Bs poste-
rior beliefs are Pr(w = H| lA, hB) = (1−pA)pB(1−pA)pB+pA(1−pB) and Pr(w = L| lA, hB) =
pA(1−pB)
(1−pA)pB+pA(1−pB) .
Then, EπB(aB = θB) = − pB−pA2pApB−pB−pA > 0 and EπB(aB 6= θB) =
(pB−pA)γ
2pApB−pB−pA < 0. Thus, Bs
best response is to reveal her signal truthfully. Second, suppose aA = l and θB = h. Then B
believes that As true signal is θA = h. Thus, player Bs posterior beliefs are Pr(w = H|hA, hB) =
pApB
pApB+(1−pA)(1−pB) and Pr(w = L|hA, hB) =
(1−pA)(1−pB)
pApB+(1−pA)(1−pB) . Then, EπB(aB = θB) =
(pA+pB−1)γ
2pApB−pB−pA+1 >
0 and EπB(aB 6= θB) = − (pA+pB−1)2pApB−pB−pA+1 < 0. Hence, Bs best response is to reveal her signal
truthfully.
Lemma A.2
Suppose that B acts in round 2 and A has already acted in round 1. Then Bs best response is
to reveal her signal truthfully always.
8.1.2 BEST RESPONSE AS THE LEADER
In following, both players follow the decision rule (2).
PLAYER A We derive As best response as the leader using the backward induction. In follow-
ing, without a loss of generality, it is assumed that θA = h. If A acts as the leader, she cannot ob-
serve Bs action before taking her own action. Thus, As posterior beliefs should be Pr(w, θB | hA).
Although A has no chance to observe aB and infer θB, she knows that Bs best response is to
reveal θB truthfully always. Then, from (2), EπA(aA = θA) = − (γpB − pB − γpA − pA + 1) and
EπA(aA 6= θA) = − (pA − γ − pB + γpA + γpB), so
EπA(aA = θA)−EπA(aA 6= θA) = (γ + 1) (2pA − 1) > 0
Therefore, As best response as the leader is to reveal her signal truthfully.
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PLAYER B In following, assume that θB = h. As B cannot observe As true signal, her posterior
belief should be Pr(w, θA|hB). However, she knows that As best response as the follower depends
on her belief for the truthfulness of Bs action. First, suppose B expects that A believes aB =
θB. Then, A always takes the same action as B. Then, EπB (aB = θB) = (2pB − 1) > 0 and
EπB (aB 6= θB) = − (2pB − 1) < 0. Thus, Bs best response is to reveal her signal truthfully.
Second, suppose B expects that A believes aB 6= θB. Then if θA = aB, A deviates from her signal
and takes a diﬀerent action from her. However, if θA 6= aB, A reveals her signal truthfully. Then,
EπB (aB = θB) = γ (2pB − 1) > 0 and EπB (aB 6= θB) = −γ (2pB − 1) < 0. Therefore, Bs best
response is to reveal her signal truthfully.
Lemma A.3
Each players best response as the leader is to reveal her signal truthfully.
8.1.3 BEST RESPONSE UNDER SIMULTANEOUS ACTIONS
In following, both players follow the decision rule (2). If actions are taken simultaneously, each
player cannot observe the other players action. Therefore, she has no chance to infer the true
signal of the other player. Also, she should consider the truthfulness of the other players action. In
following, assume that θA = h. Then, her posterior beliefs should be Pr(w, θB | hA). First, suppose
A believes that Bs action is truthful. Then, EπA(aA = θA) = − (γpB − pB − γpA − pA + 1) and
EπA(aA 6= θA) = − (pA − γ − pB + γpA + γpB), which yields
EπA(aA = θA)−EπA(aA 6= θA) = (γ + 1) (2pA − 1) > 0
Thus, As best response is to reveal her signal truthfully. Next, suppose that A believes that Bs
action is not truthful. Then, EπA(aA = θA) = (pA − γ − pB + γpA + γpB) and EπA(aA 6= θA) =
(γpB − pB − γpA − pA + 1), which yields
EπA(aA = θA)−EπA(aA 6= θA) = (γ + 1) (2pA − 1) > 0
Thus, As best response is to reveal her signal truthfully.
Also from the above, it can be shown that Bs best response is also to reveal her signal truthfully
because
EπB(aB = θB)−EπB(aB 6= θB) = (γ + 1) (2pB − 1) > 0
regardless of her belief in the truthfulness of As action.
Lemma A.4
Suppose that both players act simultaneously. Then each players best response is to reveal her
signal truthfully.
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